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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred on the Utah Court 
of Appeals by Utah Code Ann, 73-2a-3(2)(d), 1953 as amended, and 
Rule 3(a) R. Utah Ct. App. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is taken from a summary judgment granted in 
favor of the plaintiff by Judge Edward A. Watson of the Third 
Circuit Court of Salt Lake City, West Valley Department, Case No. 
8730000531CV. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The following Statutes and Rules are believed to be 
determinative of the repective issues stated: 
1. Statutes: 
(a) Utah Code Ann. 53-50-2(2): 
Any p e r s o n , f i r m , p a r t n e r s h i p , c o r p o r a t i o n , 
a s s o c i a t i o n , or o t h e r o r g a n i z a t i o n , or any combination 
of them, who for a f ixed sum, p r i c e , fee p e r c e n t a g e , or 
o t h e r c o m p e n s a t i o n o t h e r than wages, under t akes with 
a n o t h e r f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n , a l t e r a t i o n , r e p a i r , 
a d d i t i o n t o , or improvement of any b u i l d i n g , highway, 
r o a d , r a i l r o a d , e x c a v a t i o n , o r o t h e r s t r u c t u r e , 
p r o j e c t , d e v e l o p m e n t , or improvement , o the r than to 
p e r s o n a l t y , o r any p a r t of t h e m . " C o n t r a c t o r " 
i n c l u d e s : . . . ( b ) any p e r s o n who, by a d v e r t i s i n g or 
o t h e r w i s e , ho lds h imsel f out as a c o n t r a c t o r , but does 
not i nc lude a person r e g u l a r l y engaged as maintenance 
pe r sone l t o do r e p a i r , remodel ing , or o the r work which 
i s c a s u a l , i s o l a t e d , or i n c e n t a l in i t s n a t u r e . 
(b) Utah Code Ann. 58 -50-9 , 1953 as amended: 
The l i c e n s i n g r equ i r emen t s of t h i s chap te r do not apply 
t o : (8) any person who engages in the a l t e r a t i o n , 
i i 
r e p a i r , r e m o d e l i n g , or a d d i t i o n to or improvement of 
any b u i l d i n g w i t h a c o n t r a c t e d o r a g r e e d v a l u e , 
i n c l u d i n g b o t h l a b o r and m a t e r i a l s , of l e s s than 
$1 ,000 .00 , i n c l u d i n g a l l changes or a d d i t i o n s t o t h e 
con t r ac t ed or agreed work. 
Rules: 
( a ) Rule 15 ( b ) , U . R . C . P . : 
When issues not raised by the pleading are tried by 
express or implied consent of the parties, they shall 
be treated in all respects as if they had been raised 
in the pleadings. Such amendments of the pleadings as 
may be necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon 
motion of any party at any time, even after judgment; 
but failure so to amend does not affect the result of 
the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to 
at the trial on the ground that it is not within the 
issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the 
pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the 
merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the 
objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the 
admission of such evidence would prejudice him in 
maintaining his action or defense upon the merits. The 
court shall grant a continuance, if necessary, to 
enable the objecting party to meet such evidence. 
(b) Rule 54(c)(1): 
Except as to a party against whom a judgment is entered 
by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief 
to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such 
relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or 
against one or more of several claimants; and it may, 
when the justice of the case requires it, determine the 
ultimate rightss of the parties on each side as between 
or among themselves. 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case i n v o l v e s an act i o i i f or s u m s u n p a i d t: y 
defendant to plaint iff for services a-^ual;; p;rf.;-T:_ ; 
satisfactory anc workman.- ir..- *;,*r;-.. - • - ••!.*-
August, 1987 for the principal sura o: .>.• ,i::' , uw, r laintif i ~
 3s 
ciward°d H Summary Judgment (R. 121)
 Uj *t uonorable Ea,<u/~ ... 
Watson on September 2 7 , 1988. Defendant subsequently appealed. 
P l a i n t i f f and d e f e n d a n t entered into a m a n a g e m e n t 
contract (R 1) effective Septembei 1, 1982, i ihj ch was termInated 
by defendant effective November 30, 1986. During the course of 
the agreement t plaintiff retained two subcontractors to perform 
certain services for and on behalf of d e f e n d a n t : (a) O.? er 
Pools, InCc for the installation of a new swimming pool cover at 
the Donner Crest Condominium in 0c* /o- - '- ;> •*-•-•.. , ,r, of 
$ 6 0 6 . 7 0 ; and (b) H a n D a y M e n for several individual c o n t r a c t s 
including painting interior walls, railings and other surfaces at 
the Donner Crest Condominium during Maroh anr. . . ^-->. -^r 
which defendant was charged a total of $.;,?0-:.G:- '1 a i m iff j.id 
n o t u e r f o r m t h e s e r v i e e s p f* r s o n * ; • * e* o ; ~: ;, n e 
contractors for his own benefit, but for i,he benefit, of defendant 
and at defendant's instruction. 
The p a i n t ing a nd p o o L c o ve r c o sts were a pp ro ve d b y t h e 
Execut ive Committee of defendant (management c o m m i t t e e ) . S a i d 
m a t e r i a l s and s e r v i c e s were p r o v i d e d -.r;j p e r f o r m e d in a 
s a t i s f a c t o r y manner and a p p e l l a n t rece ived t;;*i Dene: i t ci :nose 
~ 1 -
services, but has not paid respondent for those materials and 
services. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE STATUTE UPON WHICH APPELLANT RELIES WAS 
REPEALED ON JULY 1, 1937, AND WAS REPLACED 
WITH U.C.A. 58-50-1 ET SEQ. UNDER THE NEW 
STATUTE, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE 
SUCH LICENSING. 
Defendant relies upon a repealed statute in its effort to 
avoid paying for services which were satisfactorily performed and 
for which it received the benefit. Under the current applicable 
statute, plaintiff is not required to obtain a license to perform 
the services in question here. Because plaintiff is not required 
to be licensed under the applicable statute, it is entitled to 
enforce the provisions of its contract. 
POINT TWO 
EVEN IF THE OLD STATUTE IS FOUND TO BE 
CONTROLLING, IT IS TO BE CONTRUED WITH THE 
PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE IN MIND ON A CASE BY 
CASE BASIS. 
Several cases discuss the purpose and application of both 
the former and current statute. These indicate that the 
legislature, the administrative agency involved, and the courts 
have intended to liberalize the application of the statute upon 
which defendant relies and that its application should be made on 
a case by case basis. In this case, both justice and equity 
demand that plaintiff be paid for the work performed in good 
faith for defendant* 
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POINT THREE 
THE COURT CAN DO EQUITY IN THIS CASE. 
The Supreme Court is acutely aware of th« d.-.. ,;. . J • . 
enrichment in a strict enforcement of* t\\e statute i-
 H , e s t l o n 
here* .•> e i* e ?,*.** r -,.:.. • • - •<-••' • * ; , j i i s statute. 
It, in fact, .3.;n)ics m a t 1 ; n a s received z i e v a 1 u e o f t h e 
services performed aiiu i,ii«u i,^ *ork performed was satisfactory. 
The plaintiff was unaware of a need to be licensed • : i to r 'etai n 
licensed persons to perform services, if indeed this is required, 
- was he aware that trie i ndependent contractors retained were 
not so l i c e n s e d . To p u n i s h h im in sp.,e of his lack of 
knowledge, and lack of culpable motive woulc ur.justiy enrich 
defendant contrary to the intent ,, -....-• .v,diute. 
POINT FOUR 
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO REL.
 w„ __ _ . _ 
OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND QUANTUM MERUIT EVEN 
THOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY PLED. 
T h e third p r a y e r for r e l i e f in r e s p o n d e n t ' s Amended 
Complaint (R. 16) states* "For su,; u — ^ . • . ...c" relief as 
the court, deems just and equitable in the premises." The trial 
court judge i s therefore able to make such judgments as i*e u«ems 
just* Defendant suffered no disadvantage from the addition of 
these causes of action to plaintiff's Complaint. They made no 
objection concern i n g a n i n a b :i ] i t y t o rn e e t t h e n e w i s s u e s a n d 
should therefore now be precluded from objecting. 
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POINT FIVE 
BY ENTERING INTO THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT, 
DEFENDANT WAIVED THE DEFENSE UPON WHICH IT 
RELIES. 
The management agreement protects the plaintiff from mistake 
of fact or law and any error of judgment except in cases of 
willfull misconduct or gross negligence. Defendant has not 
alleged, nor could it, that this is a case of willfull misconduct 
or gross negligence. It should not now be allowed to change the 
contract and unustly benefit thereby. 
POINT SIX 
THE COURT CANNOT GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Defendant is not entitled to a Summary Judgment which 
dismisses plaintiff's cause of action because there are many 
bases upon which plaintiff may recover, e.g. on the contract, on 
the basis of quantum meruit, on the basis of unjust enrichment, 
or on the basis of waiver. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE STATUTE UPON WHICH DEFENDANT RELIES WAS 
REPEALED ON JULY 1, 1987, AND WAS REPLACED 
WITH U.C.A. 58-50-1 ET SEQ. UNDER THE NEW 
STATUTE, PLAINTIFF WAS NOT REQUIRED TO HAVE 
SUCH LICENSING. 
The statute upon which defendant relies was repealed 
completely on July 1, 1987. The Contractor's Division which was 
empowered under that statute to enforce the provisions thereof 
was dismantled and all provisions for its enforcement were 
-4-
extinguished. In its place was enacted U.C.A, 53-50-1 et seq. 
This statute is administered by the Division of Professional 
Licensing, a completely separate entity. They do not investigate 
or prosecute any violations of the new statute without at least 
$10,000.00 of proven damages inn a complaint submitted by a 
municipality. (See U.C.A. 58-50-4(1)(b), 1953 as amended.) 
Because there is no mechanism to enforce the provisions of 
the old statute, the Division of Professional Licensing 
investigates, prosecutes and enforces only the provisions of the 
new statute regardless of the date of the infraction. 
Under the new statute, plaintiff would not have been 
required to obtain a general or specialty contractor's license. 
U.C.A. 53-50-2(2), 1953, as amended defines "Contractor" as: 
Any person, firm, partnership, corporation, 
association, or other organization, c .* any combination 
of them, who for a fixed sum, price, ;ee percentage, or 
other compensation other than wages, undertakes with 
another for the construction, alteration, repair, 
addition to, or improvement of any building, highway, 
road, railroad, excavation, or other structure, 
project, development, or improvement, other than to 
personalty, or any part of them. "Contractor" 
includes:. . .(b) any person who, by advertising or 
otherwise, holds himself out as a contractor, but does 
not include a person regularly engaged as maintenance 
personell to do repair, remodeling, or other work which 
is casual, isolated, or incidental in its nature." 
Plaintiff was just such a person that subsection (b) 
intended to except from the licensing requirement. Plaintiff was 
hired by defendant as a property manager with responsibilities 
including the collection of assessments from the unit owners, 
payment of expenses, making contracts for various services, 
hiring, discharging, and supervising labor performed on the 
.5. 
property, as well as make or cause to be made repairs and 
alterations. The repair, remodeling or other work perfomed by 
plaintiff for defendant was "casual, isolated, or incidental in 
its nature,ff and therefore does not come under the scope of this 
statute. 
Furthermore, U.C.A. 58-50-9, 1953 as amended, states that: 
"The licensing requirements of this chapter do not apply to: (8) 
any person who engages in the alteration, repair, remodeling, or 
addition to or improvement of any building with a contracted or 
agreed value, including both labor and materials, of less than 
$1,000.00, including all changes or additions to the contracted 
or agreed work.TT 
Plaintiff's services to defendant included the installation 
of a new swimming pool cover at the Donner Crest Condominium in 
October, 1985, for the sum of $606.70, and several separate 
painting jobs performed during March and April, 1936, which 
totalled $2,202.00, but each individual job was less than 
$1,000.00 (R. 54). 
Additionally, it should be noted that plaintiff did not 
perform the work or provide the materials in dispute, but simply 
engaged the services of two independent contractors to perform 
work approved by defendant's executive committee. Plaintiff was 
unaware, as was defendant that these independent contractors were 
unlicensed until well after the institution of this suit. 
The only possible statute upon which defendant could rely is 
-6-
U.C.A. 58-50-9, 1953 as amended, because it is the only statute 
in existence and the only one with an administrative agency in 
existence to enforce its terms. Even the Division of Profes-
sional Licensing has indicated that they look to the new statute, 
regardless of the date of infraction. Under the new statute, 
plaintiff was not required to be licensed and can therefore 
enforce the provisions of the contract. 
POINT TWO 
EVEN IF THE OLD STATUTE IS FOUND TO BE 
CONTROLLING, IT IS TO BE CONSTRUED WITH THE 
PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE IN MIND ON A CASE BY 
CASE BASIS. 
In Fillmore Products, Inc. vs. Western States Paving, Inc., 
561 P. 2d 687, 689 (Utah 1977), the court discussed the purpose 
and application of the former statute. They stated: 
"There is no doubt that the purpose of the licensing 
statute relating to contractors, supra, is protection 
of the public. But this court has recognized the 
harshness of declaring contracts of non-licensees void 
or unenforceable. . . it is inequitable and unjust to 
rule as a matter of law on summary judgment that the 
defendant can take the benefit of the plaintiff's labor 
and refuse to pay for it. . . . Therefore, the 
general rule will not doubt continue to be maintained 
as the "general" rule, while still permitting the court 
to consider the merits of the particular case and to 
avoid unreasonable penalties and forfeitures. Although 
many courts yearn for a mechanically applicable rule, 
they have not made one in the present instance. 
Justice requires that the penalty should fit the crime; 
and justice and sound policy do not always require the 
enforcement of licensing statutes by large forfeitures 
going not to the state but repudiating defendants." 
Only a few months later, the court again indicated the need 
for a case by case determination in Meridian Corporation vs. 
McGlynn-Garmaker Company, 568 P.2d 1110, 1111 (Utah 1977). They 
^ 7 « 
stated, "The entire object of the statute is protection of the 
public against fraudulent and illegal practice, which have always 
been recognized as a distinct characteristic of statutes." There 
has been no allegation by defendant, nor could there be, that 
plaintiff's practice in supplying them exactly what they 
requested constituted fraudulent or illegal practice, nor could 
defendant claim the public needs protection from this type of 
activity. 
Justice Crockett in dissent in the same case wrote, "In this 
instance, the statute merely provides that one who acts without a 
license shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. If the legislative 
intent had been that such contracts were void, the statute should 
have so declared. My conclusion is that to deny the plaintiff 
any recompense for the work performed imposes a penalty not 
provided for by the statute and one which permits the defendants 
to have an unfair and unjust advantage." Id. at p. 1111. 
It is c^ear from the foregoing discussions, that both the 
legislature, the administrative agency and the courts have 
intended to liberalize the application of the statute upon which 
defendant relies* And as the Fillmore case emphasizes, each 
application of the statute must be on a case by case basis. 
In this case, plaintiff in good faith provided services to 
defendant, fully expecting that defendant would pay for them as 
they had agreed. This reliance was justified because plaintiff 
had performed numerous other similar services for defendant 
during the course of the management contract and had been paid in 
-8-
full for those services. It was only at the termination of the 
management agreement that defendant refused to pay for the final 
satisfactorily performed work by plaintiff for its benefit. It 
is not only fair, but justice demands that plaintiff be paid for 
the work performed. 
Defendant has no need of the protection of this statute. 
Plaintiff did not perform the work personally, but simply 
retained the services of two independent contractors. Plaintiff 
was unaware that those independent, contractors were unlicensed. 
Defendant received goods and services and was satisfied with 
them, but now seeks to escape paying for the value it has 
received. 
POINT THREE 
THE COURT CAN DO EQUITY IN THIS CASE. 
The trial court is one of equity as well as law and came to 
an equitable result in this case. Many of the previously quoted 
excerpts from Utah cases indicate that the Supreme Court is 
acutely aware of the danger of unjust enrichment in a strict 
enforcement of the statute in question here. In a landmark case, 
Baugh vs. Parley, 184 P.2d 335, 337 (Utah 1947), the court 
discussed the elements required for a cause of action in unjust 
enrichment. It states, 
"Unjust enrichment of a person occurs when he has and 
retains money or benefits which in justice and equity 
belong to another. The benefit may be an interest in 
money, land, chattels, or choses in action; beneficial 
services conferred; satisfaction of a debt of duty owed 
by him; or anything which adds to his security or 
advantage. . . . However, one might perform work or 
services intended for his own benefit, or for the 
.9. 
benefit of another, in reliance upon as distinguished 
from in pursuance of an unenforceable agreement. 
Generally, unless such services enhance or benefit the 
property of the defendant or otherwise confer on him a 
direct benefit, they do not form the basis for a 
contract imposed by law because there is no "unjust 
enrichment" as that term is used in law. Where such 
services operate to confer a direct benefit upon the 
defendant, they may be recoverable." 
This has happened here. Defendant has received a direct 
benefit from the services of plaintiff and plaintiff should be 
entitled to recover with or without an enforceable contract 
because defendant requested, accepted and benefitted from those 
services. 
In addressing the issues of unjust enrichment and quantum 
meruit in a case where a contractor failed to obtain a license 
because he was unaware that such a license was needed the court 
"Undoubtedly these contractor's license statutes were 
intended to protect the general public. So ordinarily 
the failure of a contractor to obtain the required 
license before engaging in such business would prevent 
a recovery. . . . A holding that a contractor such as 
plaintiff who entered into a specialty contract with no 
knowledge or notice that a license therefor was 
required under these circumstances might work grave 
hardship to such contractor. For without any notice or 
knolwedge or lack of diligence in finding out such a 
requirement such a contractor might be barred from 
recovering for honest and efficient services rendered 
because he did not know that a specialty license was 
required." Piatt vs. Lock, 358 P.2d 95, 97 (Utah 1961). 
Again, it is uncontroverted that plaintiff was unaware that 
there was a need for such licensing, if indeed there is such a 
need, either for himself or the independent contractors he 
retained for defendant's behalf. He was further unaware that the 
independent contractors retained were not so licensed. To punish 
-10-
him in spite of his lack of knowledge, and lack of culpable 
motive would unjustly enrich defendant, 
POINT FOUR 
APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO RELY ON THE CAUSES 
OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND QUANTUM MERUIT EVEN 
THOUGH NOT SPECIFICALLY PLED. 
The third prayer for relief in plaintiff's Amended Complaint 
states, "For such other and further relief as the court deems 
just and equitable in the premises." The trial court judge is 
therefore able to make such judgments as he deems just. He ruled 
that justice required that plaintiff be paid for services 
rendered satisfactorily and good faith. 
In First Security Bank of Utah v. Colonial Ford, 597 P. 2d 
859 (Utah 1979), the court cited Rule 15(b) and Rule 54(c)(1), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and then stated, 
"Whatever else may be said about whether it is 
mandatory or discretionary under the rules just quoted 
to grant such a motion to amend, it could not be made 
plainer that the underlying purpose of the rules is 
that judgment should be granted in accordance with the 
law and the evidence as the ends of justice require; 
and that this is true whether the pleadings are 
actually amended or not.11 (Emphasis added) 
Plaintiff has not yet made a Motion to Amend to specifically 
include causes of action in unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. 
Defendant's counsel was, however, well aware of plaintifffs 
intent to rely on those principles before the hearing on the 
parties1 respective Motions for Summary Judgment because they 
were extensively argued in plaintiff's Response to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment R. 91-95). Defendant's counsel did 
not object to said principles being argued, nor did he request or 
-11-
make a representation that he needed additional time in which to 
respond to those arguments. 
Pleadings are never more important than the cause before the 
court. It is desirable for pleadings to set forth definitely 
framed issues, but justice requires liberal amendment as long as 
the opposing party has adequate opportunity to meet the newly 
raised issues. (See Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P. 2d 91*, 98 (Utah 
1931)). 
In Christopher v. Larson Ford Sales, 557 P. 2d 1009, 1011 
(Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
"It is true that our rules require that the basis of 
claim must be stated with reasonable certainty and 
clarity, so the other party will have notice of what he 
is obliged to meet. But is is also held that if the 
issue is actually tried, so that a party suffers no 
disadvantage therefrom, he is precluded from 
complaining about it." 
Defendant suffered no disadvantage from the addition of 
these causes of action to plaintiff's complaint. It made no 
objection concerning an inability to meet the new issues and 
should therefore now be precluded from complaining about it. 
POINT FIVE 
BY ENTERING INTO THE MANAGEMENT CONTRACT, 
DEFENDANT WAIVED THIS DEFENSE. 
Paragraph 3(c) of the Management Agreement (R. 1-3) entered 
into by the parties provides that, "The Agent shall not be liable 
for any error of judgment or for any mistake of fact or law, or 
for anything which it may do or refrain from doing hereafter, 
except in cases of willfull misconduct or gross negligence." 
If plaintiff did violate the statute, it certainly was only 
due to a mistake of law, from which the management agreement 
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protects plaintiff. Defendant waived its right to the statutory 
defense it now claims on September 1, 1982, when it entered into 
the original contract. It should not now be allowed to change 
the contract and unjustly benefit thereby. 
POINT SIX 
THE COURT CANNOT GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Wilkinson v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company of 
St. Paul, Minnesota, 16 Utah 2d 204; 393 P. 2d 207, 208 (1965), 
states: 
"In considering a motion to dismiss a 
complaint, both the district court and this 
court on review are to survey its allegations 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 
and grant the dismissal only if the plaintiff 
could not in any event establish a right to 
recover." 
There are many bases upon which respondent may recover, e.g. 
on the contract, on the basis of quantum meruit, on the basis of 
unjust enrichment, or on the basis of waiver. Appellant is 
th-erefore not entitled to a Summary Judgment which dismisses 
respondentfs Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
It is apparent that the trial court came to a just decision 
which should be upheld by this court when it granted summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant. Plaintiff 
urges this court to affirm the judgment of the trial court and 
award plaintiff his costs of this appeal. 
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